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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHARLES R. BREYER, JUDGE

IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL"

MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES AND

PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION,

BRS,

Plaintiff,

VS.

VS.

Defendants.

San Francisco, California Friday, July 7, 2017

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCES:

For Movant Puerto Rico Government Employees and Judiciary Retirement Systems Administration:

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Reported By: BELLE BALL, CSR 8785, CRR, RDR
Official Reporter, U.S. District Court

(Appearances continued, next page)

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BY: ROBERT J. GIUFFRA, JR., ESQ.

Friday - July 7, 2017

1:06 p.m.

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PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Calling Civil Actions C-15-MD-2672, in re

Volkswagen Clean Diesel Marketing Sales Practices, and Products

Liability litigation. And Case No. C-16-3435, BRS versus

Volkswagen AG, et al.

Counsel, please state your appearances for the record.

MR. BERG: Your Honor, Ian Berg of Abraham Fruchter & Twersky, on behalf of lead plaintiff Puerto Rico Government Employees and Judiciary Retirement Systems Administration.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. GIUFFRA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Robert Giuffra,
Sullivan & Cromwell, for the Volkswagen defendants. And with me
is my colleague Casey Dennis (Phonetic), who is a student at
Yale Law School. So this is his first sort of appearance in
court.

THE COURT: Yale Law School.

MR. GIUFFRA: Don't hold it against him.

THE COURT: No, no, I have had very good clerks from Yale.

MR. GIUFFRA: May be some here (Indicating).

THE COURT: They're not there now. But --

MR. GIUFFRA: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. JOSEPH: Your Honor, Gregory Joseph for Martin

Winterkorn.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. GONZALEZ: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Joseph Gonzalez with Schertler & Onorato, on behalf of Michael Horn, with my colleague lead counsel David Schertler.

MR. SCHERTLER: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

Well, thank you for being so accommodating. I'm sorry I had an irreconcilable conflict, as they say, this morning so I had to postpone. So I apologize. And I think a number of you came from the East Coast, and it's inconvenient. And I regret that.

The -- I have gone through the various briefs and so forth.

I have a couple of questions. And, and I want to make an assumption for our discussion this afternoon.

My assumption is that the Court would rule that the attachments to the offering memoranda are not to be considered in connection, as part of a false statement or misrepresentation. That would be actionable.

The offering memo -- and I'll put this in an order so you will have my reasons, but essentially the offering memoranda, there is a big caveat on it which says: Look, you can only really rely on what's here.

Now, I understand that there is a reference in the offering memoranda too, that there are other things out there that form a part of the solicitation in a way. But they're there to say by -- by way of explanation or further explanation. It's not by way of: These are the representations and you should include

these in the representations. 1 So, for the argument today, the parties should assume that 2 I'm only looking at the offering memoranda. Let's start with 3 that. 4 5 Secondly, and I think this is where I want to start the discussion, I'm -- as to Mr. Winterkorn, I am -- the complaint 6 doesn't, in my view, adequately represent -- adequately allege 7 what he knew, when he knew it. 8 And, you know, one has to take into account that there is 9 some lapsing of time between when a memorandum is published or 10 11 written and then circulated, and when the individual actually looks at it. I mean, there is a reasonable amount of time. 12 I think that receipt of -- I'm going to say the Gottweis --13 MR. GIUFFRA: Yes, Your Honor, the Gottweis memo, which is 14 dated --15 16 THE COURT: May 23. MR. JOSEPH: May 23. 17 MR. GIUFFRA: And the offering memorandum, of course, is the 18 15th. 19 THE COURT: Well, the offering memorandum and the purchase 20 is -- the offering memorandum is the 15th, the purchase is the 21 same day, assumably. 22 MR. BERG: Correct. 23 (Reporter interruption) 24

THE COURT: Now that I've just all gotten to know you so

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well that I know who's speaking. So --

(Reporter interruption)

THE COURT: So please forgive me, to all those people who are listening to these proceedings by telephone, I will make sure that the parties speak into a microphone. So that they can be heard by you.

I don't think there is any mystery to these dates. The question is what can one be -- what, what can one reasonably assume that a person knew as of a particular day?

But I think I have another question, well, that's sort of tied to that, which is: Assuming I would find that

Mr. Winterkorn is a -- within a control group or a control officer, do the plaintiffs have to allege that he had scienter?

That he had scienter?

And if the answer to that is yes, what evidence is there that as of -- and I'll give you the dates, May 15, May 23rd, he had scienter? And I also am saying, and this is another issue that -- I just sort of have a lot of things in mind -- is that if the first offering, if there's not enough evidence of scienter and so forth and liability as to the first offering, then are the plaintiffs going to be in a position where they're going to amend and substitute a plaintiff in who is a part of the second or third offering?

And that is the sort of question I ask, because I want to just figure out in my own mind: Where does the litigation go?

And I know litigation goes, depending on what's done, you know, the allegations of the parties and so forth.

But to spend hours and hours and hours talking about this plaintiff who is only part of the first offering, as I understand it, if there's another one in the wings on offering No. 2, that's at a later date, and it's much easier to assume that certain -- that there's certain extent -- certain knowledge out there as of a particular date, rather than the first date.

So I guess my question to plaintiff's counsel would be the first one, which involves Mr. Winterkorn. And if you would come forward, that would be great.

MR. BERG: Well, Your Honor, as I understood your questions,
I think there's two. One is with respect to whether or not
Mr. Winterkorn -- whether or not there was scienter to show that
Mr. Winterkorn was involved in the first offering.

And then the second question is: If there's not, and he is just a defendant as a control person, does that attack scienter as a whole for the entire offering?

Do I have those two questions correct?

THE COURT: Yeah, okay. You can answer those. Good start.

MR. BERG: Okay. First, with respect to Mr. Winterkorn's involvement in the first offering, and the scienter and his knowledge, I believe in the ADR case, the facts that supported scienter went earlier back than just the Gottweis memorandum.

I think there was -- I think the scienter went back to 2008,

and his involvement was in being a micro-manager of his top executives that he brought in, and that they had -- they had some knowledge going back to 2008. So I think that there's more to it than just that memorandum to indicate his scienter, as I think we addressed in our papers. But if not, we would like to have a chance to kind of amend and clarify in another proceeding.

But to get the to the second question, and why I think that might not matter, is Mr. Winterkorn's scienter is not essential with the claims, if he is just a defendant as a control person. Because you would still have scienter on behalf of the companies, and its Volkswagen and Volkswagen of America and Volkswagen of America Finance, as well as other senior executives, including defendant Horn. Which, in your latest ruling last week in June, June 28th in the ADR case, you found that there was scienter as to Mr. Horn.

And I think that's an even stronger case here, where he was in control of Volkswagen of America and Volkswagen of America Finance, which issued --

THE COURT: On May 23rd? Or May 15th? Mr. Horn? How was he? I thought he didn't really come on board until May 24th.

I may be off on these dates. So if I am, please correct me.

MR. BERG: I would direct you to the order that you just put out on June 28th. But I think you laid out a number of facts taking his scienter before May 14th, 2014. May 15, 2014. And

here, the first offering is May 23rd.

I have that order on my table, if I can go back and grab it (Indicating).

THE COURT: Sure. Of course. So what I'm interested in your finding, is what allegations are there to show that Mr. Horn knew about the device scheme before the e-mail, before the May 15th e-mail?

MR. BERG: Right. And while I look for those, I think there's two important points to make. One is that since the time our complaint was filed, there's been additional facts that have come out in the news. And some of those were incorporated into the ADR amended complaint. And I am taking for granted that those facts still exist in the universe, whether or not they are in our complaint, and that we would be able to put those, those same facts into our complaint.

But, but I also point, regardless of the scienter of Mr. Horn, there's still the scienter of the company and Volkswagen Group of America and Volkswagen of America Finance, where it doesn't have to be limited to a named defendant or to the top executive, but it just has to be executive officers.

THE COURT: Well, where is evidence to support scienter as to the Volkswagen Group of America Finance?

MR. BERG: Well, I believe in your original order you found there was scienter as to the company with regard -- with -- consistent with regard to Volkswagen, either through defendant

Winterkorn or through corrective scienter, or through their executives. With Volkswagen of America Finance, they're the actual issuers of the offerings, the bond offerings. And they're controlled by Volkswagen Group of America, which had notice of the 400- or 500,000 cars, and the scheme in general.

So I'm not sure I understand the binary question as to whether or not some people had scienter at some time versus -- the scienter is all-encompassing. If Volkswagen knew that it had this emissions scandal, the same would be true for Volkswagen, Volkswagen Group of America, and from the top executives that are controlling all of those entities. They're delineated in their legal standpoint, but it's still controlled by the same people, the same executives with the same underlying emissions scheme.

THE COURT: Maybe I should hear from Mr. Joseph, first, as to Mr. Winterkorn.

MR. JOSEPH: Thanks, Your Honor.

First let me address the timing issue that you identified, because I think the complaint may answer it. Because while the memo is dated May 23rd, which is a Friday, 2014, it says in Paragraphs 171 and 173 at 311 that it was in his weekend reading, which would be the 24th or 25th. So even if he didn't get to it on the weekend, that would be the earliest possible time that he could have gotten to it.

On the control person claim, I believe, Your Honor, under

your prior ruling -- and is it pronounced "Hui"? You know, they have to show specific facts of actual control. And now we are not talking anymore about VWAG or a company that he is an officer or a director of; we are talking about offering documents that come from a subsidiary of a subsidiary in a language that he's not familiar with. I'll not say he's not familiar. He is not comfortable in English. His English, I'm sure, is much better than my German, but he wants to speak in German when you talk to him.

So the specific facts are not there. I cannot answer the question by saying (Inaudible) scienter, independent scienter, so I'm not going to make a representation to you about that.

He didn't sign the offering memorandum. And therefore, even if one were to consider the attachments, they're just the financial statements, that are before the date in May, in any event.

So Your Honor, those are, I think, the answers I have got concisely to your questions. I just -- I wanted to point out, I want to make -- but I don't want to answer --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. JOSEPH: Well, I just want to say that I want to return to personal jurisdiction, which I've been notably unsuccessful on before.

But let me just point out to Your Honor that in the ADR decision, that principally relied on SEC Rule 12g3-2(b), and

that was the reason I believe the Court concluded there was personal availment. Your Honor wrote the opinion and knows what Your Honor's conclusion was.

That rule doesn't apply to this kind of an offer. And therefore, there was not -- if that was the ground for personal availment, there is no personal availment on that ground.

And I will also say that in terms of reasonableness, there's a specific warning in the offering memorandum, at -- Roman at Page 6, saying that you shouldn't assume you're going to have personal jurisdiction over officers and directors of VWAG.

And therefore, it's an assumption-of-risk issue. It's not unreasonable that they actually be bound by the conclusion that the risk that they were put on notice of materialized.

If you have any other questions, I'm happy to answer them.

THE COURT: Do you want to go, Mr. Giuffra?

MR. GIUFFRA: Yes, I would, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. GIUFFRA: Because I think there is a number of points

Your Honor raised that I can respond to.

Number one, Your Honor asked a good question and a practical question: What happens if you were to dismiss the claims of this plaintiff?

Well, we only have one plaintiff in this case, which is the Puerto Rico pension plan. And we don't have any other plaintiffs. And they have had plenty of time to try to get

other plaintiffs. And the rule is the plaintiff who is the -the named plaintiff must state a claim.

And this plaintiff doesn't state a claim on at least three grounds. They can't allege reliance. And I can talk about that, and it's pretty open and shut case. They have got an issue with respect to whether there is a misstatement, which I can talk about. And then they have the scienter argument that Your Honor just raised.

Now, the reason why they only have one plaintiff is that these bonds have largely matured, or are traded at or above par now.

This particular plaintiff lost, I believe, \$66,000 on a transaction that was done in October of 2015. So, there's not much here. But when you look at it in terms of the key issues on reliance, which they have to plead, they can't plead reliance because of the nature of this transaction. It's a private placement of securities.

The trade date, which is the key date as far as this plaintiff (Indicating) is concerned, is the 15th of May. And Your Honor can get that right from the certification attached to the complaint, which has a schedule which talks about the trade date.

And it references -- I can hand it up to the Court if it's helpful. You can have my copy.

THE COURT: Was it in the pleadings?

MR. GIUFFRA: Yes, it's Exhibit A to Exhibit 2, it's right here. And it says the trade date for these transactions was the 15th.

(Document handed up to the Court)

MR. GIUFFRA: So that's the operative date as far as this plaintiff is concerned.

Now, the plaintiff has to be able to establish that they actually relied on a statement that was made that they claim was false. Again, it's a securities case. You have to plead falsity, and you have to plead scienter. They can plead neither.

And they can't plead reliance. They can't plead reliance because the nature of this transaction is a private placement, a 144A offering, that was sold only to what are called qualified investment funds. And that's called a QIB. You need to have \$100 million in investments in order to buy these types of securities.

Okay. And courts have repeatedly held, whether it's the Health South case, Enron, 144A offerings are not traded in an efficient market.

And there are other cases that we've cited in our papers making it quite clear that these are -- you don't get the benefit of the basic versus (Inaudible) insufficiency argument.

Then they come back and say: Well, you should give us the benefit of Affiliated Ute, which applies in the case of an

omission. And the problem they have here, this case is a mixed case where they allege both non-disclosure as well as false statements. And they have 18 pages in their complaints.

Paragraph 198 to 230, where they discuss -- it's captioned "Misleading Statements." So they don't get the benefit of Affiliated Ute.

They have an argument here about fraud creating the market. Well, that's a theory that hasn't been recognized by the Ninth Circuit, in a case called *Nuveen* (Phonetic), made it clear it isn't. And that only applies in a situation where we have patently unmarketable securities.

It's nevertheless -- well, let's plead actual reliance. The problem with that, of course, is they want to bring a class action, and then we basically won't be able to certify the class if the only thing you have is actual reliance. And they don't even plead actual reliance by this plaintiff in this complaint.

At most, what they say is: Well, there's a statement in the offering memorandum that the investors acknowledge that they rely only on the information in the offering memorandum. But the offering memorandum, as Your Honor -- it's a very thick document (Indicating), which I actually was reading closely last night on the way out here.

And, you know, again, you have to plead -- you have to plead a false statement. And if you actually look at what it says in it, okay, the offering memorandum says nothing about, you know,

that we're complying with U.S. environmental laws. It says we have to comply with them. It says that's something you need to do.

It says at Paragraph 201 that if you don't comply with U.S. environmental laws, that there will be penalties that would be meted out by the government. And that's in the section of the offering memorandum --

THE COURT: Let's, let's take a look at 201(a). Okay? Page 57. What you cite. Says:

"Volkswagen's top priority for research and development in..."

Various years.

"...was to develop engines and drive train concepts to reduce emissions and to develop and expand modular longitudinal tool kit platforms..."

Et cetera, et cetera.

So you say that's true. And yeah, it may very well be true. It may very well be true. But what they are arguing is, to put that statement in context, they should have, they should have disclosed the fact that they have these cars that were antithetical to that.

I mean, when you say: Look, this is what we're about, we're doing X. And in order to judge are they doing X, you have to put X in a context. And the context it should have been placed in was that while they are developing engines and drive trains

to reduce emissions, they're also developing and selling cars to conceal the true state of emissions. So that's their -- that's their -- well, number -- that's their argument.

As I understand it, their argument is one of omissions. Is that when you take the statements as to what VW was doing, they may be true. They may be true. But, the -- the truth or falsity of the statement -- or anyway, the context of the statement in the entirety of what the corporation is doing is important to disclose to the public if the statement, itself, is important to disclose.

It was Volkswagen that put that in. Volkswagen. Okay. They said: This is the sort of thing we want. Whether it was individually relied upon is another statement, another issue. But this is what we want the public to know. The potential purchaser of these bonds. We want them to know what VW is doing.

So they say: Well, I'll tell you what we're doing. We're developing concepts to reduce emissions. While at the same time, they are developing devices to conceal the true state of the emissions.

Isn't that -- isn't that -- isn't that what they're saying?

I mean, whether it's true or not, isn't that what they were saying?

MR. GIUFFRA: The misstatements they allege in the complaint -- the primary misstatement, Your Honor, is one you've

already rejected, which is that the first quarter of 2014 financial statements were false because they didn't disclose --

THE COURT: Forget the financial statement.

MR. GIUFFRA: That's gone. That's gone. So all they are left with, okay, are -- and this is just falsity. Remember, as I said before, they've got the show reliance, they've got to show a misstatement, and got to show --

THE COURT: You have to be careful of the word "falsity" because it's broader than what some people would think. Some people would think like a perjury prosecution. Some people would think if a person says A, you're going to have to prove not A.

So if the statement is: We are developing engines and drive train concepts to reduce emissions, for that to be false, we would have to show that VW wasn't doing that. Well, they were. I don't know. I believe, actually, they were.

MR. GIUFFRA: If you look at the full disclosure in the offering memorandum, it's in the context of CO2. Not in the context of NOx. And there's not a single allegation in this complaint --

THE COURT: Now we're sort of moving. But I just want to see that we're all on the same page, that, that -- so we could have a slightly -- a better discussion, I think, is, is that the gravamen of their complaint, in what you have identified is if you take a look at 201(a), if you look at 201(b), a focal point

of VW's current and future development activities is and will be innovative mobility concepts, and the reduction of fuel consumption and emissions of the leak.

If you look at those two, and maybe even (d):

"Volkswagen's vehicles must comply with increasingly stringent requirements concerning emissions."

Let's take that one as an example. That's absolutely true. We know that.

MR. GIUFFRA: And in fact --

THE COURT: But in order to put it in the context, shouldn't you add a couple of words to that, so it reads: "Volkswagen's vehicles must comply with increasingly stringent requirements concerning emissions. However, to date, we've been able to get away with that by installing the defeat device which can't be detected by the regulators."

I mean that, by the way, is a complete statement, and puts that first statement in context. So what they are saying -- and of course, not going to do that, and I understand that. Or didn't do it. They didn't do it.

So is the question is: The gravamen of their complaint is that these representations in the context of what was occurring at the time needed the context of what was occurring at the time in order to make the statements meaningful. And that's their argument. Or accurate. That's their argument.

MR. GIUFFRA: Okay, can I have --

THE COURT: Yes, go right ahead.

MR. GIUFFRA: Answer No. 1 would be: These are risk factors and warnings, and two courts in this district that we cite, the LeapFrog case and the Zeid case make the point that if the -- unless the actual warning is false, and the warning was true, you do have to comply. And if you don't comply, you're subject to penalties, which is what Volkswagen said. It's not an actionable misstatement.

Number two, the statements you're focused on, Your Honor, which is the -- that it was a focal point. And that's the quote of the VW R&D. They haven't pled any facts that it wasn't the focal point of VW R&D, particularly in the context of CO2.

THE COURT: Now, when you talk about risk, the risk of what? Could you flesh that out a bit?

MR. GIUFFRA: The allegation -- what they do is they take a statement, which is a warning (Indicating quotation marks), which says: Among the other things we need to do is comply with environmental laws, and if we don't, that's a -- we can be subject to penalties.

That disclosure doesn't say: We're not violating the -we're not violating the environmental laws. If we had said
that, then they would have a misstatement or they would have
scienter and reliance? That's a different question.

But if the statement just says: We have -- giving a cautionary -- I's have argued this type of an argument many,

many times. If it's just a pure warning, okay, and the warning is accurate on its face, multiple courts, including two in this district, have held that is not an actionable misstatement.

THE COURT: And the warning being what?

MR. GIUFFRA: The warning being you have to comply with the environmental laws, and if you don't comply with the environmental laws, you're subject to penalties, which is at Page 24 of the offering memorandum.

THE COURT: And you say it's a warning because you are saying to the purchaser that environmental laws may change? Is that what -- I want you to explain to me why it's a warning.

MR. GIUFFRA: It is a warning because you are basically saying the risks when you buy these bonds, among the risks that you're faced with is that we may not be complying with environmental laws.

And if we're not, the company is subject to --

THE COURT: You say the cases say that? I'm surprised they say that. I could understand if the cases are saying -- oh, I have to look at them -- I can understand if the cases are saying or should say that since the enforcement of environmental laws, since the -- no. Since the creation of regulations relating to the environment are the task of a third party that Volkswagen doesn't control, therefore there is a risk that a third party could change the rule.

Let's say the next day EPA wakes up and says: You know what

you're going to have do with all your cars? You're going to have to do A, B and C.

Which they've never done before, or -- never done before.

Well, that's too bad for the bondholders, you know, because

Volkswagen's not at fault. What they've done is simply identify a third party out there who has control over the situation. So I understand that.

And it is a warning, as I understand the word "warning" -that's why I'm asking you this question -- warning in that
context means: What are you telling the buyers? You're telling
-- or the prospective purchasers? You are telling them that
there is a risk that these rules and regulations may change.
And if they do -- and this, by the way, came up all -- in the
context of solar energy all the time because of the favorable
treatment that solar energy was given at a certain period of
time in our nation's history.

And, and the idea was: Well, you'd better tell the purchaser out there that he or she is at risk, because these regulations may change.

MR. GIUFFRA: No, Your Honor. In fact --

THE COURT: You don't mean that.

MR. GIUFFRA: No.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GIUFFRA: Again, we have three grounds to rely on:
Reliance, misstatement and scienter. But on the misstatement

grounds, which is what we are talking about right now --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GIUFFRA: -- the law is quite clear, because public companies in their disclosures will repeatedly say: We're subject to all these laws, and if we violate them as Volkswagen did, we may be subject to penalties.

That would mean if you put a risk factor out there, and it turns out you have a violation, and you haven't disclosed the violation at the time you put out the risk factor, there's a misstatement.

And in fact, the law is to the contrary. The law is that number one, unless the risk factor, itself, and the disclosure around the risk factor is false, it's not false.

And so, here, there's no disclosure saying: We're not in violation of the law. All the disclosure is saying: We're subject to all these laws --

THE COURT: Yeah, but you have to tie the other thing in there and say: We are now endeavoring to ensure that our cars are -- are in compliance with lower emission standards or improving the emission standards.

MR. GIUFFRA: That's not what the disclosure says. Again, Your Honor, if you could take just the risk factor, find a violation, and say there's a misstatement because you said we may be subject as to these risks and you haven't disclosed what's going on at the company at the time, that would mean in

every single case plaintiffs would be able to point to a risk 1 factor and turn it into a misstatement, when it was supposed to 2 be something that was -- when it's an affirmative statement 3 This is a risk buying this security. If you buy this 4 5 security, we're subject to environmental laws. And the actual disclosure at Page 24 talks about if we're 6 7 not in compliance, we could have to pay penalties. And much of the disclosure is directed to European penalties related to CO2. 8 Maybe so. But let me ask this question, then. THE COURT: 9 So you're telling me, if you say: By the way we are subject 10 11 to environmental laws, and we are -- as long as we don't say: We're in compliance with environmental laws, then we haven't 12 made a false statement. 13 MR. GIUFFRA: That's what the law has been, at least in my 14 15 experience. And it says -- and it talks about, it says -- this 16 is the actual, this is Page 24 of the offering memorandum. 17 It says: "A violation of applicable regulations." 18 So it says, the lead-in is -- and I always think it's 19 important to look at the document. 20 THE COURT: Go ahead. 21 22 MR. GIUFFRA: It says (As read) 23 "Regulatory legal and tax-related risks." And at 2.1, this is all on Page 24: 24

"We are subject to a range of different global regulatory

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and legal requirements that are constantly changing." 1 Talks about CO2. Doesn't talk about NOx. 2 But then it says: 3 "A violation of applicable regulations..." 4 Presumably that's a violation of Volkswagen. 5 "...could lead to the imposition of penalties, fines, 6 7 damages, restrictions on and revocations of our permits and licenses, restrictions on..." 8 Now, to put that in context, to make it a -- a THE COURT: 9 -- I think, you see, I think that when somebody reads that, 10 11 isn't it fair to assume that they think that the company is not knowingly violating the law at that point? Knowingly violating 12 the -- the emission standards. 13 For example, you could say: The company is liable for 14 15 Tax law, they must pay taxes. Okay, everybody must pay taxes. 16 taxes. 17 MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, I read a case, and I referenced this before, that the Second Circuit affirmed regarding UBS. 18 UBS had a disclosure that says: If we are found to violate tax 19 laws we may be subject to fines, et cetera, et cetera. 20 21 warning. In that case, literally, the company entered into a deferred 22 23 prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice for allegedly assisting its customers in evading U.S. taxes. 24 allegation was that senior management at the highest levels of 25

the bank knew about it. And that, that warning was a warning. It wasn't the fact that you didn't also disclose that you were in violation of the law --THE COURT: Well, but it deferred prosecution. You are as much of an expert as I am in this area. Deferred prosecution agreements are not concessions by a defendant that they did violate the law. MR. GIUFFRA: Well, in fact, in fact --THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. GIUFFRA: In fact, they often are. You have to make --THE COURT: They often are, but it's not an ipso facto It's not because a deferred -- one of the criticisms in that procedure is that it doesn't exact an admission from a defendant that they violated the law. To the contrary, they simply say: Look if we do A, B, C and D -- and by the way, it could be negotiated in the agreement. I'm not saying that they're always one way or the other. And I didn't look at the UBS agreement. That's one, they had admissions that there MR. GIUFFRA: was, there was activity at the bank, the bank was involved --THE COURT: But there may be a different interpretation. Anyway, I'll take a look at it.

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MR. GIUFFRA: My other point, my other point, Your Honor, that we cite is a case is In re UBS Securities, 2014. The point is that these warnings, every company makes warnings like: We

are subject to all these laws, and if we are found to have violated them, we may be subject to penalties.

If that was all you needed to have a false statement case, every single case would be a slam-dunk false statement case for plaintiffs.

Now, what Your Honor is focused on are the two disclosures about focal point and top priority. And our point there would be, number one, they don't plead that anyone relied on those particular disclosures, in a massive thick document (Indicating).

Number two, we believe that those statements, in and of themselves, are puffery, they are not a statement of fact. It's a top priority of the company, it's a focal point of our research. The main point is that they are not saying that we're not in violation of environmental laws.

And you know, a good case, Your Honor, it is a Sixth Circuit case involving Ford where they said quality and strong R&D pipeline, you know, for Ford, same kind of thing. That was deemed to be puffery and non-actionable.

And the other point, Your Honor, which you recognized in your decision last week, is that a company does not have an obligation to accuse itself of wrongdoing.

THE COURT: No, it doesn't. I agree with that. I agree with what I said. As a matter of fact, absolutely right. There is no doubt in my mind.

But look at Paragraph E of Page 58. Page 58 of the complaint. Sorry, of the complaint. I know you would like to go back to -- it does quote, it does quote the offering memo, but I don't know where it is in the offering memorandum. So I'm looking at Paragraph E of Paragraph 201.

I think everything in that paragraph is true.

MR. GIUFFRA: (Inaudible)

THE COURT: Right. It's true. It goes on line after line after line, discussing the importance of the regulations, and, and what it does, and how stringent it is. And they impose standards for diagnostic systems, on and on and on.

But to put it in context, it is the argument of the plaintiffs that to put that statement in context, they should disclose that Volkswagen has devoted resources to defeating those standards. Defeating the disclosure of the failure to meet the standards.

That -- in other words, you can -- this wasn't just a -Mr. Giuffra, I really am sympathetic to your position, if it
were like a boilerplate throw-away line. Then I would have to
try to figure out: Well, it's in everything, it's just that -it's a nodding of the head, it's a doffing of the top hat. I
mean, you know, I could understand that.

But this goes on line after line after line, and I don't think I'm exaggerating it. The standards for emissions control. That is discussing the structure, the framework, the mechanism.

And then they don't disclose, because again, I would say they don't have to blow the whistle on themselves, of the fact that they are devoting resources and have devoted resources to feeding it.

So, so it's clear, or to try to make it a little clearer what I'm saying, it's not that they have to disclose wrongdoing. It's a question, when you disclose doing something which -- well, when you say to the prospective purchaser: Look at all this out there --

MR. GIUFFRA: It's a risk.

THE COURT: Look at all this out there they have in place, the government has in place for monitoring our emissions. The failure to say: And by the way, we have installed devices which defeat this process, that is a misstatement by omission. I think. And I know you disagree.

MR. GIUFFRA: My only point, Your Honor, is that the opposition in our brief, opposition 28, we cite a series of cases including two from this district, LeapFrog and Zeid, which we think take the position that a warning, when you say: We are subject to all these -- we're subject to all these regulations, and if we don't follow the regulations there may be penalties and fines --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GIUFFRA: That, in and of itself, doesn't mean you have an obligation to disclose any violations of law that you are

engaged in, because that would mean in every company in doing this kind of an offer is going to disclose all --

THE COURT: So I will reread those cases. If they came from this district, they have to be good.

MR. GIUFFRA: I agree, Your Honor. The next thing

Your Honor is saying, or just a couple of points there which
have been talked about.

THE COURT: Sure.

Then I'll turn to you (Indicating).

MR. GIUFFRA: Okay. These bonds are issued by an entity called VW Group of America Finance. Okay. Not VWAG, which is the guarantor. And VW Group of America, which is where Mr. Horn worked, is not a guarantor of these bonds at all.

Now, there's no allegations in this complaint that Horn or Winterkorn were involved in the preparation of the offering memorandum. Nothing.

They've got to plead, Your Honor, that there was knowledge of -- you know, Winterkorn or Horn or someone involved in actually doing this offering memorandum. And group pleading in this circuit is not good law, and we cite cases at Page 27 of our opposition brief.

But they've got to plead somebody new. So who are the two people they point to? They point to Professor Dr. Winterkorn. And all they have on Professor Dr. Winterkorn is the Gottweis memo, which, as Mr. Joseph pointed out, is dated the 23rd.

Well, the transaction -- and I gave you the --

THE COURT: I think, not to spend a lot of time on this, but I think that's absolutely true. I think that if it relied -- if it rested on the Gottweis memo and that was it, the defendant wins.

MR. GIUFFRA: Second, Your Honor, on Mr. Horn, all they have there is on the 15th that he got a memo. And again, there's no allegation that he was involved in this offering, even knew about the offering. And the only thing that Dr. Winterkorn was alleged to have done is sign the first quarter financial statement. There's no allegation --

THE COURT: But that is out.

MR. GIUFFRA: Yeah, and that's out. So Your Honor, our point is: They don't point to a single human being on the face of the earth who had scienter with respect to the statements that they're talking about.

If the statements they're talking about are either these warnings or, you know, top priority (Indicating quotation marks), they've got to focus on a specific human being that knew about it.

Now, the notion of collective scienter, which we don't need -- Your Honor has applied in some circumstances, and has not applied in other circumstances in this case, and you applied it in the context of, you know, all the advertisements and all of the emissions statements on cars.

But you did not apply it in the context of the securities disclosures which were the offering which -- which were the financial statements. You did not. And that made good sense, because the whole notion of collective scienter -- which I have doubts about whether it is correct but I'm not going to argue that under the PSLRA -- is one where the statement has to be one that's so important and so dramatically false that someone who is responsible for the document must have known it was -- must have known it was false.

They don't allege who was involved in doing this, in doing this financial -- this offering memorandum. They don't allege whether someone who knew top priority (Indicating quotation marks) was wrong or not wrong, or even whether it wasn't a top priority. So they can't plead scienter. Whether you want to disagree with me about falsity, they can't plead scienter.

And then of course the principled ground --

THE COURT: If it were just the second and third offering memorandum, would you concede that might be a difficult -- that might be an easier way for them to prove scienter?

MR. GIUFFRA: It's a different case. Not this case.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. GIUFFRA: The problem they have, Your Honor, is they have one plaintiff. And where I started out, Your Honor, these bonds, people didn't lose a lot of money on these bonds and some people have made money on these bonds. And the bonds are now

currently trading either at or above par. And a lot of them have actually been redeemed. And this plaintiff lost

1.5 percent on their transaction. So, the fact that they can't get another plaintiff to come in here is telling.

But beyond all that, they've got to establish -- and

Your Honor has a decision which is absolutely correct, which

stands for the proposition -- it's the *Autozone* case from

2009 -- that the lead plaintiff has to state a claim.

They don't allege that this lead plaintiff even looked at the sentences. Again, it's two sentences in a massive document (Indicating). They don't allege that he relied on those or that the pension fund relied on those two sentences in a massive document.

And so if this lead plaintiff cannot state a claim, they're done. They can't come in and say -- and they actually said in their brief: Oh, give us a chance to find someone else.

Well, the plaintiffs' lawyers are not the party interest here. It's the plaintiff. If their plaintiff doesn't have a claim, you know, and someone else doesn't come in, it's over.

And the idea that you can sort of: Well, we didn't plead a claim on the first one when we actually bought, but then, but maybe we could plead something on the second and third when we haven't got a plaintiff who bought in the second and third offerings --

THE COURT: I don't know. I don't know whether they do or

not. 1 MR. GIUFFRA: They have to come in and bring one up. 2 THE COURT: Well, I understand that. If what you are saying 3 is they don't have one in this case, you are right. 4 5 MR. GIUFFRA: So again --THE COURT: So, so the question is whether they would be 6 allowed to amend, whether -- whether they could bring it on 7 behalf of somebody who's in group 2 or group 3. I don't know. 8 MR. GIUFFRA: But right now --9 THE COURT: If they do, we will see you back here. 10 11 MR. GIUFFRA: Correct, Your Honor. And I come to San Francisco a lot, and I like coming to San Francisco. 12 I know you do. So does your family. 13 THE COURT: MR. GIUFFRA: Yeah, but actually now that the weather's 14 15 getting -- in the wintertime we'll be out here again, sure. 16 THE COURT: I'll set a date, maybe set a date in December. 17 MR. GIUFFRA: Ideally when the San Francisco Ballet is performing. 18 Well Misty Copeland is coming. 19 THE COURT: That's when we want to come. 20 MR. GIUFFRA: 21 THE COURT: Good, well, I'll get you that date. 22 MR. GIUFFRA: So to sum up, Your Honor, they can't prove 23 reliance, I think they can't prove a misstatement, and they can't prove scienter. And when you look at the scienter 24 25 allegations, they point to Horn and Winterkorn. And I think

just in our colloquy, it's pretty clear that they don't have sufficient pleading of scienter for Horn and Winterkorn as of the date of their trade, which is, on their own document, is the 15th of May.

Thank you.

MR. BERG: Your Honor, I'm eager to get to reliance and misstatement, but I certainly want to start with scienter --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BERG: -- and standing. Now on better footing.

In your January 4th, 2017 ADR order, you say plaintiffs alleged that Horn acted with scienter because he knew through an email dated May 15, 2014. Our class period starts May 23rd, 2014.

What I think I heard you saying is that the time period of May 15th to May 23rd when the first offering occurred might not be enough time to digest the information and to act upon it. I don't know that there is support for that in any circumstance. But I'll point that this is a special circumstance where you are doing an offering.

And the offering comes from Volkswagen of America Finance, which is a special entity formed for the sole purpose of issuing these bonds, and is controlled by Volkswagen of America.

So if you go to your June 28th, 2017, order in the ADR case, you talk about allegations in the complaint support that

Mr. Horn had actual control over Volkswagen Group of America,

and Volkswagen of America.

So here, you have a person who you found to have actual control over the entity essentially controlling the offering, who knows that there is an offering going out to investors which contained information, who was aware more than a week before that there is this emissions scandal that is going to cause a material impact on the company.

So while eight days might not be enough time to digest information in another context, in the context of an offering, it certainly is.

And I'll add to that by going back to your January 4th, 2017, order with respect to defendant Winterkorn. And certainly you talk about the memo on May 23rd which you have already addressed, but you also say in 2011, there's an internal whistleblower who warned the company, including Winterkorn's confidente and Volkswagen's then head of development, that the company was illegally manipulating reported emissions data.

So I think that's enough to show that Winterkorn had scienter before May of 2014. But even if it's not, you're pointing to a senior executive at Volkswagen who certainly does.

And it's wrong to say that we have to point to a specific person to show scienter. There is corporate scienter. There are securities cases where the company is the only defendant in the case, without an individual defendant, and you showed the scienter through the top executives.

And the notion that nobody at Volkswagen, nobody at Volkswagen of America including Mr. Horn who received the email or the people writing the emails to Mr. Horn, knew about this emissions scheme is not supported. Some, some executive knew, and you have to show that the entities knew through their executives.

It doesn't have to be defendant Winterkorn, which we think your order says may have known in 2011 due to his control over his confidants and his lieutenants that he brought in from (Inaudible) to do this work. But certainly, Mr. Horn knew a week in advance, but also knew that this offering was taking place. So, I think that's enough to show scienter.

But with regard to standing, let's not forget, Mr. Giuffra knows better than anyone, having helped write the legislation, but the PLSRA, the counsel or lead plaintiff -- this case was filed by a plaintiff who did have standing in some of the other offerings. And we all come before you, as the statute says that we should, to see who should control this case on behalf of all plaintiffs and all claims alleged.

And what we argue in terms of standing is it is an adequacy issue to be addressed at class certification, and that the lead plaintiff here has standing to bring the claims on behalf of all with the same set of concerns. So, you know, I think that addresses that.

To get to the -- the misrepresentations in the claim, I

think you are exactly right, that this case is about the omission, and then the misrepresentations that support the omission.

And the *Vivendi* case, Second Circuit, is right on point to making that analysis, and the difference between a case where you have misrepresentations that fall short so you try to claim that they're omissions versus a fundamentally omissions-based case where you have a network of smaller lies supporting the broader fraud.

And I think if you take it in context, that addresses reliance, in the sense that you would be able to rely on Affiliated Ute and the omissions case.

But let's not forget, in that same circuit, in the Second Circuit, you're allowed to invoke both presumptions, Affiliated Ute and Basic, regardless of whether or not it's predominantly an omissions case.

And to get to the risk factor -- I'm trying to be quick
here -- I think if you look to Apple, you'll see that when you
make a statement, it has to be reasonably believed. And there
can't be information that you have available to you, that you
know, that contradicts what you're saying.

And when they put forth all of these representations about compliance and environmental compliance, they don't have information that supports that. And they have contradictory information that goes counter to that.

And it goes right back, I think it's Judge Pollack who says:
You cannot warn that you may fall in a hole, knowing full well
that the Grand Canyon lies one step ahead of you.

So I think that's the better analogy in terms of representation versus the risk factors, and the cases that Mister --

THE COURT: So it's a bit like the Grand Canyon. I'll concede that.

MR. BERG: We believe it was. Are there any questions?

THE COURT: No. I think I want to hear from other counsel who want to address as to Mr. Horn.

MR. GONZALEZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. GONZALEZ: A quick clarification. Plaintiffs' counsel is trying to push the purchase date out to May 23rd. They're saying in their own pleadings the purchase date is May 15. It says that in their pleadings, it says that in the memorandum. So it's May 15. They're stuck with that date.

The reality is it doesn't matter, though. Because even if it was the 23rd, look, the case law is very clear: You have a chance to digest information. It says there's an omissions issue. And CEOs, part of a multi-national company, are allowed to digest that information.

So, and the case law speaks of weeks, sometimes even months. Eight days, certainly not sufficient, and they haven't cited to

a single case where they showed that it was.

Finally, on the scienter point, they're relying on the ADR opinion, the January ADR opinion. And in the January ADR opinion, the Court did find scienter with respect to Mr. Horn.

But it's critical to keep in mind that the Court relied on facts post-dating the receipt of the May 15th email sometimes by years. And so all of that collectively gave forth to an inference of scienter that wasn't too time-specific, but it didn't need to be, in that context. Here, it does need to be time specific. And they haven't shown that.

Finally, the statements. So, they haven't alleged a material omission or misstatement specific as to Mr. Horn. The only statement that they have is something that took place a year later, April 27, 2015. And it is in the context of a social responsibility report.

And truly, the statements that are alleged against him are classic puffery. But the bottom line is what they have is a logic problem. You can't claim that you relied on a statement that occurred a year after you effected the purchase. And they haven't addressed that point, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BERG: Your Honor.

MR. GIUFFRA: Just --

MR. BERG: (Inaudible)

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. BERG: I take exception --

THE COURT: You might want to stay up here.

MR. BERG: I take exception to the characterization of the purchase date versus an order date. Because the offering was completed on May 23rd. And that's important --

THE COURT: The trade date, said the trade date was May 15.

MR. BERG: But the trade date is putting in the order, but the offering date --

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. BERG: The offering didn't complete until May 23rd. So there's an order in place for the shares. And that's important for two reasons. Because if you disclose the truth, you have the opportunity to cancel that order. But more important, it goes to the pricing of the bond.

If you purchase a bond from corporate debt, you have a pricing matrix: Yield, maturity, length. But it's primarily based on credit rating. And if this information had come out, Volkswagen -- when the information did come out, Volkswagen's credit rating went down.

So, if the information came out when Mr. Horn learned it on May 15th, then the credit rating of Volkswagen goes down, and the price is cheaper. And when you're buying bonds, that's a major consideration. And when you go to purchase bonds, you know exactly what price you are paying for a AAA, a AA, or a BBB. And that's what you get.

And that's -- there's damages that lie in there, in the fact that this offering that completed May 23rd wouldn't have been done at that same credit rating. MR. GONZALEZ: Briefly, Your Honor. By Page 37 of plaintiff's opposition, it states, quote -- or plaintiff, quote: "...placed its purchase order on May 15, 2014." By its very terms, Rule 10b-5 has to do with the purchase or sale of a security. So, thank you. MR. GIUFFRA: Your, Honor just a couple of things. THE COURT: Yeah. MR. GIUFFRA: Again, you've got to focus on the plaintiff before you. And that's something I think the other side would like to gloss over. The notion that someone who doesn't have a claim can somehow represent a class of people, additional offerings, clearly is not right. THE COURT: No, I don't agree with that. I mean, if he doesn't -- if May 15th or May 23rd, not to -- doesn't present a claim, then this plaintiff is out. Because you can't -- you can't make him --MR. BERG: Agreed. THE COURT: Yeah, everybody agrees. MR. GIUFFRA: Okay, good. And the point there, Your Honor,

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is to the extent there is a case you should look at, it's the
Countrywide case, which talks about -- this is Judge Pfaelzer's
case, which two -- one is in 2012 --
               Wasn't that cited before the -- there's another
    THE COURT:
case.
   MR. GIUFFRA: Another case called NECA, which is a Second
Circuit case.
    THE COURT: There was a Ninth Circuit case.
               (Inaudible)
   MR. BERG:
               I'm sorry?
    THE COURT:
   MR. BERG:
               Melendez (Phonetic), your Honor.
    THE COURT: Yes.
                 That's a Ninth Circuit case.
   MR. GIUFFRA:
    THE COURT: Welcome to the Ninth Circuit.
   MR. GIUFFRA: Yes, we are. But the issue there was -- and
they weren't dealing with securities, and it didn't deal with,
you know, the kind of issues that we're talking about here.
That was a case where the named plaintiff could assert a claim.
And the question was in the context of, you know, racial
profiling by the police, whether this person could represent a
class of people who were being racially profiled by the police.
    That's a different issue than whether someone can represent
someone who -- in offerings that they didn't participate in,
about disclosures they didn't see.
   And so, you know, I think you don't have to reach that issue
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in this case because their plaintiff doesn't state a claim, can't.

And he made the point before about reliance. The key there is in a case in this circuit, it's got to be primarily an omissions case. They have 18 pages of false statements. You and I have been going back and forth about the false statements that they allege in their -- that are in the offering documents. They don't get the benefit of *Ute*.

At best, Your Honor, they've got to rely upon actual knowledge -- or, I mean, actual reliance. And they don't even plead that or say that they relied on a particular document.

THE COURT: I don't know that I agree with that. I don't know that you could rely on Ute.

MR. BERG: Just to address Countrywide very quickly, within Countrywide is the same test that's used, the same set of concerns. But Judge Pfaelzer draws a distinction between mortgage-backed securities and corporate debt, saying corporate debt is the same issue where the same person is responsible for payments, whereas mortgage-backed securities draw upon different pools of mortgages, so each tranche is essentially different because you're relying on different mortgages packaged together. So I think even within Countrywide, Judge Pfaelzer draws that distinction. And that's enough here.

MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, one other scienter point, which a lot of time has been spent on. With respect to Mr. Horn,

there's no allegation that he had any involvement with VW Group of America Finance at all; that he was involved in this offering. His name doesn't appear in the offering memorandum. He was not a board member of VW Group of America Finance. Okay Dr. Winterkorn was also not a board member of the entity that was actually doing the offering.

And so, if you want to try -- the law is pretty clear.

You've got to have scienter of someone involved in this offering document. And they don't allege a single person who was involved in the offering document had any scienter. And the best they can do is point to Richard Horn because he's the CEO of the overall company. Okay.

You're left with sort of this debate about -- you're left with this debate about the 23rd and what he knew on the 23rd. Which is, by the way, after the date they purchased the shares, based on their own certification.

And similarly, with Horn, there is not a single allegation that he had anything to do with VW Group of America Finance.

Much less this offer. So they can't connect it up to him.

THE COURT: Mr. Joseph, do you want to add anything to this?

MR. JOSEPH: Just one sentence. Because we have gone on too long.

THE COURT: I want to justify the trip out here.

MR. JOSEPH: It's not appropriate to engage in guilt by association because one of his subordinates knew. The whole

point of having trusted subordinates is that they deal with problems, and everything isn't elevated to the CEO. If there is an inference, it's not a strong inference, as required by the PSLRA.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. BERG: I would only add to that that if --

THE COURT: Speak into the mic.

MR. BERG: If the question is how high up the chain does it go for the entity scienter, even if Your Honor was convinced that Mr. Winterkorn, Dr. Winterkorn -- I mean no disrespect -- did not have scienter, the association, the question is how far up to the executives did it go.

And it seems from your previous orders on allegations in our complaint that it went up to his top lieutenants and the people in charge of the scheme. And that should be enough for the company.

And with respect to Volkswagen of America Finance, the same officers and directors that are -- that run that entity, as alleged, are from Volkswagen of America. There's a lot of cross-over there. It is a special-purpose entity form just to issue these offers. So there are senior enough executives at both, which Mr. Horn controlled, according to your order.

THE COURT: If I have -- are you going to be able to get another plaintiff?

MR. GIUFFRA: Your Honor, the only point I would point, the

things he just said, they're not in the complaint. They're not 1 in the complaint. 2 THE COURT: Well, he wants leave to amend. 3 MR. GONZALEZ: Your Honor, if I could briefly --4 5 THE COURT: Yes. MR. GONZALEZ: Thank you. 6 7 Just to follow up on what Mr. Giuffra said, there is absolutely no allegation whatsoever that Mr. Horn had anything 8 to do with the offering memoranda, that he looked at it, that he 9 was connected to it, that he signed it, connected to him in any 10 11 way, whatsoever. And so clearly, under Janus (Phonetic), he couldn't qualify as a statement maker with respect to it. 12 13 Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 14 15 MR. BERG: No, I just -- I just point you to your own 16 finding that he controlled -- that Mr. Horn controlled 17 Volkswagen of America, which controlled the offer. 18 Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. I'm going to take 19 20 the matter under submission. 21 MR. JOSEPH: Thank you. 22 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. GIUFFRA: 23 THE COURT: Thank you. (Proceedings concluded) 24 25

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I, BELLE BALL, Official Reporter for the United States Court, Northern District of California, hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. BelleBall /s/ Belle Ball Belle Ball, CSR 8785, CRR, RDR Friday, July 7, 2017